Legal Developments: Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: THE DEFUNIS Case by Elliott, Patrica C.
Woman C.P.A. 
Volume 36 Issue 4 Article 7 
10-1974 
Legal Developments: Affirmative Action and Reverse 
Discrimination: THE DEFUNIS Case 
Patrica C. Elliott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elliott, Patrica C. (1974) "Legal Developments: Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: THE 
DEFUNIS Case," Woman C.P.A.: Vol. 36 : Iss. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa/vol36/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 




Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: THE DEFUNIS Case
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA 
University of Washington 
Seattle, Washington
Various affirmative action programs 
around the country are not being met 
with praise or accolade by a growing 
number of people affected by them. In 
many cases people simply do not under­
stand what affirmative action really is. 
Some people are absolutely convinced 
that it is a quota system that forces uni­
versities and business firms to hire in­
competent women and minorities. While 
this belief is mistaken, it may have a solid 
basis as a result of the way some affirma­
tive action plans are applied or perceived 
by those trying to implement them.
Affirmative Action
"Affirmative Action" is a concept begun 
and promoted by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
and the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO). The basic purpose of affirmative 
action is to lower traditional barriers 
against women and minorities in higher 
paying and status jobs. The statistical 
data clearly shows that women and 
minorities have been, and are now, clus­
tered in the lower positions in the univer­
sities. (E.g., there are very few women 
who are full professors and most women 
are lecturers, instructors, or assistant pro­
fessors. This is true even where educa­
tional degrees, publications and other 
qualifications are equal to men's who are 
associate and full professors.) Affirmative 
action was begun to remedy this situa­
tion. It does not require universities to 
"hire any but the most qualified 
people."1 What it does require is that 
universities conduct a diligent search for 
qualified women and minorities and to 
have documented proof of that search. It 
is not a quota system and it does not re­
quire that unqualified people be pro­
moted. It merely attempts to insure that 
women and minorities are given equal 
scrutiny for faculty positions. For exam­
ple, in the University of Washington's af­
firmative action plan (which is in excess 
of 200 pages, excluding appendices), no­
where does it state a quota and there is not 
one single reference to giving preference 
to unqualified women or minorities. It 
simply says that persons who are hiring 
must make a diligent search to find qual­
ified women and minorities to fill the ap­
propriate positions.
Unfortunately, there is a definite back­
lash. Employers and supervisors are 
complaining that there are not enough 
qualified women and minorities so they 
are being forced to hire incompetent 
women and blacks. Women who attained 
high positions before affirmative action 
feel that their efforts and status are being 
downgraded because their superiors and 
colleagues think that any woman in a high 
position is there because she is a woman, 
not because of her efforts, qualifications 
or competency. The people who are hired 
under affirmative action are meeting with 
resistance and discrimination by 
superiors who are convinced that they are 
"quota bums". But amid all this grum­
bling one major theme seems to emerge: 
people will be glad to hire and promote 
qualified people whether they are female, 
black or any other minority group. (This 
contention, on the part of some, is a sin­
cere one; for others, it appears to be lip 
service.) Even the most strident oppo­
nents of affirmative action suggest that 
more "appropriate emphases [be put 
upon ] increasing the supply of well- 
prepared women and blacks with doctoral 
degrees."2 One must come to the conclu­
sion, then, that education is the key to 
raising the status of women and 
minorities. A recent Supreme Court case 
examined this problem when it heard a 
reverse discrimination case of a white 
male denied entrance to law school.
The DeFunis Case3
In 1971 Marco DeFunis, a white male, ap­
plied for admission to the University of 
Washington School of Law. That year the 
University of Washington Law School re­
ceived 1601 applications for admission for 
about 150 available spaces. In order to fill 
these spaces, 275 applicants were offered 
admission. Thirty seven of those offered 
admission were minorities and eighteen 
of them actually entered law school. De­
Funis was not offered admission.
The U of W admissions process is based 
upon an index called the "Predicted First 
Year Average." This average is computed 
by a formula giving various weights to the 
applicant's grades in the last two years in 
college, the score obtained on the Law 
School Admissions Test (LSAT) and a 
Writing Test Score. That year the admis­
sions committee (comprised of faculty, 
administration and students) decided 
that the most outstanding applicants were 
those who scored 77 or above. The highest 
score was 81. By August 1971, 147 appli­
cants with averages of 77 or better had 
been offered admission. All but a few of 
the applicants with an average below 74.5 
were eliminated. (The few who were not 
eliminated were saved for committee con­
sideration on the basis of information in 
their files that indicated greater promise 
than was suggested by their averages.4)
Finally, the committee accumulated 
those applications with scores between 
74.5 and 77 for consideration. DeFunis 
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was in this group with a score of 76.23. 
These applications were distributed ran­
domly to the committee members who 
would consider the applications competi­
tively, with rough guidelines as to how 
many could be admitted. The decisions 
were made on the basis of information in 
their files. After offering about 200 admis­
sions, a waiting list was constructed and 
divided into four ranks. DeFunis was on 
this list in the lowest quarter. Ultimately, 
he was not offered admission.
Applications of blacks were handled 
differently. Whatever their averages, they 
were not passed on to the committee 
chairperson for rejection. Neither were 
these applications randomly distributed 
to committee members, they were instead 
given to two particular members: a black 
law student and a professor who had 
worked in a special program for disadvan­
taged students considering applying to 
law school. Other minority applications 
were assigned to an assistant dean. At no 
time were the minority applicants com­
pared to the other applicants, but they 
were compared competitively with other 
minority applications. Thirty seven 
minority applicants were admitted, thirty 
six of whom had "Predicted First Year 
Averages" below DeFunis' average. (30 
had averages below 74.5, meaning that, 
had they been white, they would have 
been rejected.) There were also 48 non­
minority applicants admitted who had 
averages below DeFunis.5 The University 
conceded that it placed less weight on 
black applicants' averages than upon 
those of white applicants. The Law School 
also stated that had the minority students 
been considered under the same proce­
dure as other applicants, none of those 
who were eventually enrolled would have 
been admitted.6
DeFunis commenced suit in a Washing­
ton trial court, contending that "the pro­
cedures and criteria employed by the Law 
School Admissions Committee invidi­
ously discriminated against him on ac­
count of his race in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States 
Constitution."7 DeFunis brought suit on 
his own behalf (rather than as a class ac­
tion suit) and asked the court to "issue a 
mandatory injunction commanding the 
respondents to admit him as a member of 
the first-year class entering in September 
of 1971, on the ground that the Law School 
admissions policy had resulted in the un­
constitutional denial of his application for 
admission."8 The lower court upheld his 
claim and he was admitted to the Law 
School in 1971. On appeal, the Washing­
ton Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court's verdict. DeFunis then petitioned 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
and the circuit judge "stayed the judg­
ment of the Washington Supreme 
Court,"9 pending the final Supreme 
Court decision.
The United States Supreme Court first 
considered his certiorari petition in the 
fall of 1973. Thus, DeFunis was in his last 
year of law school. Since it was not a class 
action suit, the case would have been 
rendered moot had the court not heard the 
case before DeFunis graduated. Neither 
DeFunis nor the University of Washing­
ton wanted the case dismissed as moot. 
The University of Washington indicated 
that "if the decision of the Washington 
Supreme Court were permitted to stand, 
the petitioner could complete the term for 
which he was then enrolled but would 
have to apply to the faculty for permission 
to continue in the school before he could 
register for another term."10
The case was finally argued on Feb­
ruary 26, 1974 and the decision reached on 
April 23, 1974. By this time DeFunis had 
registered for his final quarter in law 
school.
The final decision of the Supreme Court 
was a disappointment to both the re­
spondents and the petitioner as well as 
other people following the case. One 
writer said the justices "went mute by 
declaring the case moot, . . . [and 
wrangled ] over why they should duck the 
case."11 In a 5-4 decision, the Court de­
clared the case moot and refused to con­
sider the constitutional questions in­
volved. The minority opinion (written by 
Mr. Justice Brennan) decided on the same 
narrow grounds as the majority, only the 
minority decided the case was not moot. 
In effect, then, the decision was a non­
decision. The Justices bickered about 
whether or not there was some prospect 
that DeFunis would not graduate at the 
end of the quarter (and thus be required 
to re-apply) and the case was decided es­
sentially on that point.
While some accused the Court of avoid­
ing a painful decision and abrogating its 
duty, others felt there was no alternative 
for the Court. If they ruled against De­
Funis, they would be advocating denial of 
constitutional rights. If they had ruled for 
DeFunis, there was some fear that all af­
firmative action plans would have been 
summarily abandoned by all universities. 
The Court may have to decide the issue 
because DeFunis (who has since 
graduated) is back in the Washington 
courts attempting to get the case changed 
to a class action suit.
Justice William O. Douglas was one of 
the dissenting minority but he felt so 
strongly about the case that he wrote a 
separate dissenting opinion.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Douglas took a rather historical 
approach in his lone dissenting opinion. 
He related how the philosophy in the 
early twentieth century was to allow each 
law student into school and prove 
him/herself in the first year. As spaces for 
students became more scarce, the pres­
sure to use some sort of admissions test 
mounted. The LSAT was introduced in 
1948 and has been the main common en­
trance criterion since then. He then pro­
ceeded to demolish its effectiveness by 
stating that the truly creative individual 
may do poorly on a "few hours' worth of 
multiple choice questions." He also 
raised the possibility of a cultural bias in 
the LSAT.12 This contention has merit 
from other studies of other tests. For ex­
ample, Robert Williams has developed 
the Black Intelligence Test of Cultural 
Homogeneity (the Bitch test) and has 
tested it on whites. To no one's real sur­
prise, whites do quite poorly because the 
test measures whites' knowledge of the 
black experience (presumably the oppo­
site of existing white-oriented I.Q. 
tests.)13
Justice Douglas next attacked the valid­
ity of prior college scores. He pointed out 
the obvious: that one school's "A" is 
another's "C" (which renders the grade 
point average, GPA, meaningless), and 
that since the late 1960's the average of all 
college grades has risen dramatically (pre­
sumably because of the Viet Nam War 
when a failing student might be drafted 
and because of a general raising of social 
consciousness about racial discrimina­
tion). As one author noted, these higher 
grades "infalted the students' grade point 
average and presented the law school 
with nearly meaningless data on which to 
predict the minority's chances at success­
fully surviving the rigors of law study."14 
Further, "there is no clear evidence that 
the LSAT and GPA provide particularly 
good evaluators of the intrinsic or en­
riched ability of an individual to perform 
as a law student or lawyer in a functioning 
society undergoing change. Nor is there 
any clear evidence that grades and other 
evaluators of law school performance, and 
the bar examination are particularly good 
predictors of competence or success as a 
lawyer."15
Finally, Justice Douglas noted that GPA 
and LSAT do not measure relative prog­
ress or motivation. A ghetto black who 
rises to a junior college has made more 
progress than, say, a Harvard student 
from an affluent (Harvard-educated) fam­
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ily. "Because of the weight of the prior 
handicaps, that black applicant may not 
realize his [sic ] full potential in the first 
year of law school, or even in the full three 
years, but in the long pull of a legal career 
his [sic ] achievements may far outstrip 
those of his [sic ] classmates whose ear­
lier records appeared superior by conven­
tional criteria."16
Justice Douglas' conclusion was that, 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
"separate treatment of minorities as a 
class is to make more certain that racial 
factors do not militate against an applicant 
or on his [sic ] behalf."17 He, therefore, 
would have upheld the University of 
Washington's Affirmative Action Plan 
and separate admission procedures for 
minorities.
The Aftermath and Applicability of 
DeFunis
The furor and indecision witnessed in 
Seattle and at the University of Washing­
ton as a result of the DeFunis case is in­
teresting. The Law School is uncertain as 
to what to do (pending the outcome of 
Marco DeFunis' attempt to have the suit 
declared a class action one) so they are 
continuing their existing policies. Others 
are "choosing up sides." On the one 
hand, the liberals are pointing out that 
education itself has always been dis­
criminatory: the affluent produce chil­
dren who become affluent; alumni's chil­
dren get preferential treatment; society's 
goals should not be to educate an elite few 
but to even out past injustices; and, any­
way, there has always been discrimina­
tion (at taxpayer's expense) in favor of 
athletes, etc.
On the other hand, the other side is 
gathering substantive data supporting 
the view that the Law School should not 
use two admission policies. In a nutshell, 
"the law school has proportionally more 
minority students flunking out now than 
was the case five years ago, and no one is 
sure why."18 The Law School is reacting 
by providing special re-admission (or re­
tention) procedures for minority students 
who flunk courses and by providing spe­
cial tutoring services for minorities.19 
Opponents are pointing out that "of the 
first group of 13 specially admitted 
minorities to take the bar [exam] last 
year, 10 passed. That's a passing ratio di­
rectly comparable to white students."20
In all of this activity, not one word has 
been said about women law students. 
However, the women's legal students' or­
ganization is becoming more verbal, 
pointing out that they, too, are a minor­
ity. As it stands, the University of 
Washington Law School uses exactly the 
same criteria for admitting women as it 
does white men (presumably on the 
premise that white women have roughly 
the same cultural biases as white men 
and, therefore, no special tests or admis­
sion policies need be applied).
Conclusion
While the decision in DeFunis was disap­
pointing and did not result in definitive 
guidelines for affirmative action pro­
grams, it was of interest in its effects. 
Many are hoping that DeFunis is success­
ful in his bid to change his suite to a class 
action one so that the Supreme Court of 
the United States will make a definite rul­
ing in the future. Until then, each univer­
sity must stumble along doing the best it 
can with existing affirmative action plans.
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ACCOUNTANCY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, Dr. Adolf J. 
H. Enthoven; American Elsevier Publish­
ing Company, Inc., New York, N.Y., 
1973; 380 pages, paperback.
The author's experience in public ac­
counting, academia, and with the World 
Bank leads him to believe that accounting 
is not serving its broader purposes. He 
visualizes that accounting should extend 
horizontally — i.e., report and measure 
economic data of business, government, 
and social accounting areas; vertically — 
i.e., value costs and benefits for indirectly 
related items in addition to the directly 
related items which are now reported; 
and in time — i.e., report prospective ac­
tivities necessary to provide a framework 
for decision making. His hope is that 
countries may someday be able to con­
solidate corporate figures into sector fig­
ures and into national figures. From the 
point of view of the World Bank, this 
would enable better assessment of a de­
veloping country's present stance and its 
economic potential. Present handicaps 
are lack of any accounting in certain seg­
ments of some countries and the wide 
differences in accounting as it is practiced 
in some of the developed countries.
The book is very readable. Sentences 
are simple and one hardly notices that 
English is not the author's native tongue. 
Some chapters deal with national income 
accounting, and this may be somewhat 
unfamiliar to accountants more used to 
dealing with micro-economic reporting. 
However, chapters on taxation and ac­
counting, uniform or standardized ac­
counting, current value accounting and 
PPBS (planning-programming-bud­
geting systems) are familiar topics.
One may not agree with all Dr. Entho­
ven proposes. Some of his conclusions 
(current value, prospective information) 
are not too far removed from certain as­
pects of the Trueblood report. He encour­
ages coordination and integration of the 
accounting discipline with other disci­
plines, especially economics. He also 
hopes it will become more goal-oriented.
In addition, his writings contain in­
formation about systems and societies in 
other countries — extremely valuable in­
formation for accountants in a world 
which is steadily shrinking and becoming 
more internationally minded.
M.E.D.
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